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Abstract 
 
Prior research show that banks have various motivations for influencing loan loss provisions. This study examines these 
motivations and the behaviour of loan loss provision in relation to the business cycle. After controlling for the impact of Basel 
regulation on LLP, I find strong evidence for income smoothing, capital management and procyclical LLP behaviour during the 
voluntary, not mandatory, adoption of IFRS in Nigeria. I find evidence of signaling only after including interaction terms in the 
model. Additionally, I find that (i) banks increase loan loss provisioning after the implementation of Basel; (ii) banks have some 
incentive to signal via LLP in the post-IFRS period relative to the pre-IFRS period (iii) banks have joint motivations to 
manipulate LLP and may face trade-offs in the choice of managing regulatory capital or smoothing income in the post-IFRS 
period. Overall, I conclude that IFRS reinforces LLP motivations and procyclical patterns. The findings of this paper are relevant 
to current concerns of accounting standard setters and bank regulators on the current model of loan loss provisioning as well 
as the on-going debate on the mandatory implementation of IFRS in Nigeria. 
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 Introduction 1.
 
Provision for bad debt or loan loss provision, hereafter LLP, is a deduction from bank net interest income to cover 
expected credit losses on bank loan portfolio. Bank regulators continue to stress that loan loss provision should be 
sufficient to minimize loan loss on bank loan portfolio. However, emerging empirical studies suggests that bank managers 
may have other incentive(s) to influence or manipulate reported loan loss provision estimates other than mitigating 
expected credit loss. Though standard setters emphasize transparency in the measurement of provisioning estimates to 
avoid opportunistic managerial behaviour, studies find that banks may influence LLP to reduce the variability of income 
(income smoothing), manage regulatory capital, and signal loan quality. Also, studies in the banking literature, argue that 
bad debt provisioning is procyclical with the business cycle. They argue that banks delay provisions until it is too late. The 
effect of the 2008 financial crisis has raised debates among regulators and academics about IFRS’s backward looking 
provisioning model.  
Motivated by these concerns and the voluntary adoption of IFRS reporting among commercial banks in Nigeria, I 
examine whether bank managers influence LLP to smooth income, manage capital, signal loan quality and whether 
provisioning is procyclical with the business cycle during the voluntary adoption of IFRS. Furthermore, I test for joint 
motivations in the pre- and post-crisis period and IFRS period. First, I predict and find strong evidence for income 
smoothing in the post IFRS period after controlling for Basel capital regulation. Second, I predict and find strong evidence 
that banks use LLP to manage regulatory (Tier 1) capital to avoid violating regulatory capital requirements. Third, I find 
evidence for signaling in the IFRS period. Based on further test, I find evidence that managers may have joint motivations 
for influencing loan loss provision estimates. Finally, I predict and find that banks delay provisions until a recession 
materializes.  
First, this paper contributes to the accounting choice literature which suggest that managers have various 
incentives for choosing and influencing some accounting numbers, in this case, loan loss provisions. Second, this paper 
contributes to the recent literature in favour of the debate to improve the current IFRS provisioning model which is highly 
criticized for its inherent procyclical pattern. Third, this paper contributes to the banking literature on bank capital 
adequacy. The literature argues that strong capital buffers ensure that bank capital is sufficient to absorb unexpected 
losses and external shocks. I find that banks use LLP as a form of capital which can be increased (decreased) when 
capital is low (high). Fourth, this paper is the first to examine income smoothing, earnings management, signaling and 
procyclicality of LLP in Nigeria. I provide a developing country evidence for the concerns raised about the validity of 
ISSN 2039-2117 (online) 
ISSN 2039-9340 (print) 
        Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 
            MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy 
Vol 6 No 2 
March  2015 
          
 225 
IFRS’s current provisioning model. By employing recent bank data, inferences based on the result may inform financial 
reporting policies. Finally, this empirical evidence contributes to the current debate that criticizes the recent mandatory 
implementation of IFRS by the Central bank of Nigeria in 2012. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the empirical literature and develops the 
hypotheses based on the literature review. Section 3 presents the methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical 
results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 2.
 
2.1 LLP and earnings management  
 
Earlier studies documents evidence for earnings management using LLP (Ma, 1988; Hasan and Hunter, 1994; Lobo and 
Yang, 2001; Hasan and Wall, 2003). Also, the recent literature provide evidence for income smoothing. For example, 
Kanagaretnam et al., (2004) found that banks use discretionary LLP to smooth income but not to signal private 
information. Anandarajan et al. (2007) show that publicly traded commercial banks in Australia engage in earnings 
management practices. Perez et al. (2008) found evidence for income smoothing using 142 Spanish banks from 1986 to 
2002. Leventis et al. (2012), using a sample of 91 EU banks, found that income smoothing is more pronounced among 
risky banks but this smoothing behaviour is less aggressive after implementation of IFRS. In a US study, El Sood (2012) 
found strong evidence for income smoothing. Balbao et al. (2013), using 9442 US banks from 1999 to 2008, found 
evidence for income smoothing but suggest that this relationship may be driven by non-linear patterns. Curcio and 
Hassan (2013) find strong evidence for income smoothing among non-EU credit institutions. They report that EU firms 
within markets with high protection of creditor right do not smooth income. On the other hand, some studies show 
conflicting evidence (for example, Wetmore and Brick, 1994; Ahmed et al., 1999). Ahmed et al. (1999) found no evidence 
to support the income smoothing hypothesis after the implementation of Basel 1. Overall, the literature documents more 
positive evidence of smoothing via LLP. Therefore, consistent with these studies, I hypothesize that there is a positive 
relation between LLP and pre- tax and pre-provision earnings in the post-IFRS period. This follows the reasoning that 
when bank profits is abnormally high (low) banks tend to increase (decrease) LLP either to minimize the volatility of 
earnings or to avoid regulatory scrutiny (Wall and Koch, 2000). Thus,  
H1: A positive relation exist between LLP and pre-tax and pre-provision earnings in the post IFRS period. 
 
2.2 LLP and signaling 
 
Managers tend to signal private information about their firm to reduce information asymmetry and to communicate 
positive inside information to investors (Akerlof, 1970). The literature reports a positive relation between stock returns and 
abnormal LLPs and a negative relation between normal LLP and stock returns, suggesting that investors perceive LLP as 
a tool used to signal private information about future firm performance (Wahlen, 1994; Beaver and Engel, 1996; Liu et al. 
1997). After controlling for non-discretionary changes in LLP, Wahlen (1994) found a positive relation between 
discretionary provisions and stock returns and future cash flow which suggest that investors interpret abnormal provisions 
as a signal of good news rather than as a signal of bad news (high expected credit losses). Liu et al. (1997) reports that 
investors interpret high LLP as good news when banks are experiencing default problems. Also, they showed that banks, 
with low regulatory capital ratio in the fourth fiscal year, had positive stock market reaction following unexpected increase 
in LLP. Kanagaretnam et al. (2005) found that the propensity to signal private information is positively related to the 
degree of information asymmetry and that undervalued banks use LLP to signal private information about future 
performance. Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) in a study of European banks found evidence to support the signaling 
hypothesis. Curcio and Hasan (2013), investigated earnings management in the context of the capital adequacy among 
EU banks and non-EU credit institutions. Interestingly, they found that non-Euro area banks use earnings to signal private 
information to investors. On the other hand, Ahmed et al. (1999) did not find strong evidence to support the signaling 
hypothesis among US banks. In a study of Spanish commercial banks, Anandarajan et al. (2003) and Perez et al. (2008) 
both do not find strong evidence to support the signaling hypothesis. Subsequently, Anandarajan et al. (2007) found 
insufficient evidence to support the signaling theory among Australian banks. 
To develop the signaling hypothesis, Wahlen (1994) suggests that LLP will contain some positive signal about loan 
quality after controlling for other non-discretionary indicators of loan default such as changes in non-performing loans and 
loan charge-offs. Following this reasoning, if bank managers believe that investors view abnormal increase in LLP as a 
signal of loan quality, a positive relation between LLP and future earnings can be expected. Also, IFRS emphasizes the 
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need to disclose information to investors and other users of financial reports. Therefore, bank managers, under IFRS, 
might take advantage of this disclosure opportunity, to use LLP to signal loan quality to investors, implying a positive 
relation. Similar to prior studies, I hypothesize: 
H2: A positive relation between LLP and one-year ahead change in pre-provision earnings in the post IFRS period 
is expected. 
 
2.3 LLP and regulatory capital management 
 
Prior studies suggest that, to avoid the cost associated with violating capital regulatory requirements, bank tend to 
manage regulatory capital using LLP (Whalen, 1994; Ahmed et al., 1999). These studies argue that banks tend to 
increase (decrease) LLP when regulatory capital is low (high) (Moyer, 1990; Beaver and Engel, 1996; Wall and Koch, 
2000). For example, Moyer (1990) finds that managers adjust the timing of LLP to avoid violating bank capital limit. Beatty 
et al. (1995) argue that LLP influences loan quality and capital management decisions. Similarly, Ahmed et al. (1999) 
found evidence that banks use LLP to manage capital adequacy ratios to avoid violating minimum capital requirement. 
Anandarajan et al. (2007) found evidence to support the capital management hypothesis. Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008), 
investigating the pro-cyclical behavior for 186 European banks, found that banks with low capital use LLP to manage 
regulatory capital. On the other hand, some country-specific studies find no evidence to support the capital management 
hypothesis (Perez et al. 2008; Leventis et al., 2011). Leventis et al. (2011), using a sample of 91 banks found no 
evidence for capital management after the implementation of IFRS. 
After the convergence to Basel capital regulation in Nigeria immediately after the crisis, there were costs 
associated with violating minimum capital requirement. If the cost of violation is perceived to be severe, bank managers 
may have an incentive to influence regulatory capital ratio via LLP. This is consistent with Ahmed et al. (1999) and Wall 
and Koch (2000). This incentive will be greater if banks view LLP as a form of capital. Therefore, I hypothesize: 
H3: A negative relation between LLP and Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio in the post-IFRS period. 
 
2.4 LLP and Procyclicality 
 
Studies report that LLP is negatively related to the business cycle measured by GDP growth rate (Arpa et al., 2001; 
Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Perez et al., 2006; Floro, 2010; Packer and Zhu, 2012). 
Laeven and Majnoni (2002) found that banks delay provisioning until it is too late, suggesting procyclical LLP behaviour. 
Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) did not find evidence that banks in OECD countries increased provisions in periods of 
economic boom in anticipation of a recession. Perez et al. (2006) investigated the determinants of LLP among Spanish 
banks and found LLP to be procyclical. Beaty and Liao (2009) found that banks delay the timing of provisioning until 
recessionary periods sets in. They argue that increased loan loss provisioning during a recessionary period further 
reinforces the recession. Floro (2010) finds procyclical provisioning behaviour of among banks in Philippine but noted that 
such relationship is influenced in a nonlinear way by bank capitalization. Packer and Zhu (2012), in a study of Asian 
banks, found that provisioning was procyclical among Japanese bank but countercyclical for banks in India. Therefore, 
consistent with these literature, I hypothesize that banks delay increased provisioning until a recession sets in. Therefore, 
I hypothesize: 
H4: A positive relation between LLP and change in gross domestic product in the post-IFRS period. 
 
 Methodology 3.
 
3.1 Data and sample selection 
 
The dataset employed in this study were extracted from bank financial statement and World Bank database. Data were 
carefully reviewed for inconsistencies. Concerning outliers in the data, I did not proceed to exclude data in the upper and 
lower bounds of the distributions because the data is not large due to the small commercial bank population in Nigeria. 
Also, I do not want to lose further observations which could deteriorate the validity of inferences made based on the 
findings. Sample bank inclusion criteria include: (i) bank must have existed from 2002; (ii) bank voluntarily adopted IFRS 
reporting from 2009; (iii) bank was subject to Basel capital regulatory requirements with the evidence of reporting Tier 1 
capital as well as total regulatory capital ratio; (iv) bank must have complete data, otherwise, it is excluded; (v) only 
commercial banks are included to ensure that sample banks face homogenous investment activities and financing 
methods, thus, development banks, merchant banks, savings, thrifts and cooperative banks are excluded. A final sample 
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of 10 banks for a 12-year period, i.e. 2002-2013 which gives a total of 120 bank-year observations. This period is 
sufficient enough to capture economic downturn and upturns, financial crisis as well as alternative regulatory regimes 
(IFRS and Basel). 
 
3.2 Model Specification 
 
To test the three hypotheses - income smoothing, regulatory capital and signaling, I adopt a modified model derived from 
existing models in the literature (Ahmed et al., 1999; Anandarajan, et al., 2007; and Leventis et al., 2011). The modelling 
of LLP takes the functional form below: 
LLP = f [(non-discretionary), (discretionary), (control variables)] 
For this study, the econometric model adopted is panel-data regression with fixed effects. 
LLPi,t = Į1 + Į2 NPLi,t + Į3 LLPi,t-1 + Į4 LOANi,t  + Į5 EBTPi,t + Į6 SIGNi,t + Į7 GDPRj,t + Į8 SIZEi,t + Į9 
IFRSj + Į10 POSTj + Į11 EBTP*IFRSi,t + Į12 SIGN*IFRSi,t + Į13EBTP*MCAPi,t + Į14TRC*EBTPi,t +   
Į15TRC*SIGNi,t + Į16MCAP*SIGNi,t + Į17MCAP*EBTP*SIGNi,t + Į18TRC*EBTP*SIGNi,t +   Į19SIGN*EBTPi,t + ܭi,t 
Where, 
LLP - Loan loss provision divided by total assets for firm i at time t 
EBTP - Earnings before tax and provision divided by total assets for firm i at time t 
LLPt-1 - Beginning loan loss provision divided by total asset for firm i at time t  
NPL - non performing loan divided by total assets for firm i at time t 
SIGN - one-year ahead change in earnings before tax and provisions for firm i at time t 
MCAP - Tier I regulatory capital ratio for firm i at time t 
TRC - Total regulatory capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2) for firm i at time t 
GDPR- change in Gross domestic product 
SIZE - bank size derived as the natural logarithm of total assets for firm i at time t 
IFRS*EBTP- interactive variable indicating income smoothing in the post IFRS regime for firm i at time t 
IFRS*SIGN - indicating signaling in the post IFRS period for firm i at time t 
POST - dummy variable controls for pre-and post-Basel regulation and pre- and post-crisis period. 
EBTP*MCAP - indicates income smoothing and Tier 1 capital management for firm i at time t 
TRC*EBTP - indicates income smoothing and total capital management for firm i at time t firm 
TRC*SIGN - indicates income smoothing and Tier 1 capital management for firm i at time t 
MCAP*SIGN - indicates Tier 1 capital management and signaling for firm i at time t 
MCAP*EBTP*SIGN - indicates smoothing, signaling and Tier 1 capital management for firm i at time t 
TRC*EBTP*SIGN - indicates smoothing, signaling and total capital management for firm i at time t 
SIGN*EBTP - interactive variable indicating income smoothing and smoothing for firm i at time t 
 
3.3 Variable Description 
 
The dependent variable is LLP. After controlling for non-discretionary (NPL, LOAN, LLPt-1,) and discretionary influences 
on LLP (EBTP, SIGN, MCAP), the variables of interest in the main regression are IFRS*EBTP and IFRS*SIGN. Non-
discretionary variables employed are non-performing loans, beginning loan loss provision (LLPt-i), ratio of loans and 
advances to customers divided by total bank total asset (LOAN). These variables explain external factors beyond 
managerial control that have an influence on LLP. This is consistent with prior studies (Ahmed et al, 1999; Hasan and 
Wall, 2004; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008; Fonseca and Gonzàles, 2008). NPL controls for non-discretionary influence on 
specific provisions while LOAN controls for general reserves. A positive sign is expected because when banks predict 
that loan will go bad, they would increase provision, accordingly. Also, a positive sign is expected on LOAN variable. 
LLPt-1 should have a negative sign. It follows the reasoning that when banks increase provisions in the previous period, 
provisions for the current period is unlikely to increase proportionately. 
Discretionary influences on LLP include EBTP, MCAP and SIGN variable. Using the EBTP variable to indicate 
smoothing is consistent with prior studies (e.g. Ahmed et al, 1999; Anandarajan, 2007; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008; 
Fonseca and Gonzàles, 2008; Leventis, et al., 2011; Curcio and Hasan, 2013). A positive sign on the coefficient indicates 
income smoothing, a negative sign indicates otherwise. Also, Ahmed et al. (1999), Leventis, et al. (2011) and Curcio and 
Hasan (2013) use the relation between LLP and the ratio of Tier 1 capital before LLP (MCAP) to test the capital 
management hypothesis. MCAP is measured as Tier 1 capital ratio before LLP divided by minimum capital adequacy 
ratio. TRC is used as an alternative form of capital. Total regulatory capital (TRC) ratio is the sum of Tier 1 (MCAP) and 
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Tier 2 capital and is used to observe whether LLP is used to manage TRC. A negative sign on the MCAP coefficient is 
expected if poorly capitalized banks increase LLPs to increase bank capital to avoid violating capital requirement, 
otherwise, positive. Consistent with Ahmed et al. (1999), Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008), Curcio and Hasan (2013), I 
employ the SIGN variable defined as the one-year ahead change in earnings before taxes and LLPs (that is, EBTPi,t+1 - 
EBTPi,t)/0.5(TAi,t + TAi,t+1). TA represents total asset. I expect that banks may or may not take advantage of the 
disclosure arbitrage in IFRS to signal loan quality to investors. 
POST indicates the change to Basel capital regulation after the financial crisis. This dummy variable takes the 
value of 1 for post-Basel (or post crisis) period, otherwise 0. I expect increased provisioning after the crisis as a 
precautionary risk management behaviour among banks. Therefore, I expect a positive sign between LLP and POST. 
Also, I expect that IFRS dummy variables takes the value of I when banks voluntarily adopted IFRS and 0, otherwise. In 
2009, commercial banks in Nigeria voluntarily adopted IFRS. However, it is difficult to predict this sign because 
differences in implementation and enforcement of IFRS across countries may significantly affect this relationship. Further, 
a positive sign on EBTP*SIGN indicates that banks jointly smooth income and signal future prospects, otherwise, 
negative. A positive sign on EBTP*MCAP and EBTP*TRC indicates greater incentives to smooth income than to manage 
capital, and vice versa. A negative sign on TRC*SIGN and MCAP*SIGN indicates greater incentives to manage capital 
than to signal, and vice versa. GDPR tests whether LLP is procyclical with the business cycle. This is consistent with prior 
studies (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Anandarajan et al., 2007; Fonseca and Gonzàlez, 
2008; and, Curcio and Hasan, 2013). A negative sign indicates LLP is procyclical, otherwise, positive. Size is expected to 
have a positive sign. It follows the reasoning that large banks tend to have larger loan portfolio and will tend to increase 
provision more.  
 
 Discussion of Empirical Results 4.
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
Table 1 present the descriptive statistics for the full sample and pre- and post-IFRS sample period. The mean value of 
LLP in the pre-IFRS period is 0.028 while for the post-IFRS period (0.02). An increase in mean value of loans to 
customers loans (LOAN) is observed in the post-IFRS period (0.402) relative to pre-IFRS period (0.281). The mean ratio 
for profitability is higher in the post-IFRS period (0.045) relative to the pre-IFRS period (0.036). A decrease in bank non-
performing loan is observed in the post IFRS period (0.058) relative to pre-IFRS period (0.72). This might suggests that 
banks to expect minor loans default in the post-IFRS period relative to the pre-IFRS period due to improved credit risk 
monitoring system and loan diversification across diverse sectors. Finally, total assets increased in the post-IFRS period 
(13.74) relative to the pre-IFRS period (12.15). Table 5 provides the Pearson correlation coefficients of the sample 
variables. In the post IFRS period, LLPs are positively and significantly correlated to EBTP and LOAN. All variables give 
the expected theoretical sign except MCAP and SIZE. However, these conflicting signs are not statistically significant. 
Finally, for the entire sample period as shown in Table 3, a significant positive correlation between LLP and POST is 
observed indicating that Basel capital regime, after the 2008 crisis, led to significant increase in loan loss provisioning 
among Nigerian banks. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Full Sample Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
Year 2002-2012 2002-2007 2009-2013 2002-2006 2010-2013 
Variables Mean (SD) Max (Min) Mean (S.D) Max (Min) Mean (S.D) Max (Min) Mean (S.D) Max (Min) Mean (S.D) Mean (S.D) 
LLP 0.023(0.068) 0.504 (-0.103) 0.028 (0.09) 0.504 (0.0002) 0.02 (0.039) 0.168(-0.103) 0.009(0.011) 0.054(0.0002) 0.019(-0.04) 0.168(-0.103) 
NPL 0.063(0.116) 0.8740 0.072(0.141) 0.874(0.001) 0.058(0.091) 0.4890 0.059(0.099) 0.549(0.001) 0.038(0.412) 0.3460 
LLPT 0.021(0.067) 0.504(-0.103) 0.009(0.013) 0.054(0) 0.038(0.101) 0.504(-0.104) 0.068(0.007) 0.0310 0.019(0.035) 0.124(-0.103) 
LOAN 0.337(0.048) 0.617(0.002) 0.281(0.114) 0.493(0.002) 0.402(0.118) 0.617(0.155) 0.293(0.109) 0.493(0.007) 0.393(0.122) 0.617(0.155) 
EBTP 0.04(0.048) 0.362(-0.11) 0.036(0.06) 0.088(-0.027) 0.045(0.071) 0.362(-0.107) 0.039(0.018) 0.088(-0.006) 0.045(0.078) 0.362(-0.107) 
SIGN 0.009(0.031) 0.121(-0.105) 0.010(0.031) 0.088(-0.105) 0.006(0.032) 0.121(-0.104) 0.014(0.022) 0.088(-0.038) 0.006(0.034) 0.121(-0.104) 
GDPR 9.923(8.44) 33.7(3.4) 13.12(10.23) 33.7(3.4) 5.86(1.31) 7.8(4.3) 15.34(10.95) 33.7(3.4) 5.6(1.345) 7.8(4.3) 
SIZE 12.77(1.593) 21.77(9.34) 12.15(1.281) 15.07(9.34) 13.74(1.44) 21.77(11.19) 11.73(1.347) 15.07(9.34) 13.84(1.56) 21.77(11.19) 
TRC     3.442(5.639) 30.56(-1.82)   3.636(6.72) 30.56(1.82) 
MCAP     1.708(2.236) 4.49(-9.71)   1.811(1.422) 4.476(-2.912) 
Obs. 120  60 50 50 40 
Note: SD and Min in parenthesis. S.D - Standard deviation; Max - Maximum; Min - Minimum. 
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4.2 Main Regression Result 
 
First, to test that the sign on the coefficients are consistent with theoretical expectations, I regress LLP with discretionary 
and non-discretionary variables, IFRS and POST. I exclude all interactive variables. Regression 1, show that all variables 
are consistent with theoretical expectations except SIZE and LOAN. Second, to examine the impact of IFRS on EBTP 
and SIGN, I introduce two interactive variables, IFRS*EBTP and IFRS*SIGN. Regression 2 show a significant positive 
coefficient for IFRS*EBTP and IFRS*SIGN at the 1% and 10% significance level, respectively. The support for smoothing 
and signaling hypothesis is significant after the inclusion of the interactive IFRS variables. Also, I find a significant positive 
sign on the POST coefficient and a significant negative sign on the IFRS dummy variable which suggests that regulators 
emphasize increased bank provisioning while the IFRS tend to discourage aggressive provisioning for transparency 
concerns. This is consistent with theory.  
 
Table 2: Regression Result. 
 
Full Period (2002-2013)  Regression 1 Theoretical consistency Regression 2 Main Result 
Variables Exp. Sign Coefficient t-statistic p-value Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
C ? 0.115* 1.84 0.069 0.198*** 3.32 0.0012 
NPL + 0.321*** 5.71 0.000 0.238*** 4.20 0.0001 
LLPt-1 - -0.126 -1.52 0.131 -0.108 -1.39 01671 
EBTP + 0.011 0.09 0.931 -2.144*** -4.62 0.0000 
SIZE + -0.008 -1.63 0.106 -0.009** -2.01 0.0477 
SIGN + 0.102 0.57 0.568 -0.484* -1.96 0.0534 
GDPR - -0.0007 -0.95 0.345 -0.0002 -0.28 0.7790 
IFRS ? -0.054** -2.56 0.012 -0.121*** -5.091 0.0000 
POST + 0.085*** 4.07 0.0001 0.057*** 2.85 0.0054 
LOAN + -0.07 -1.13 0.2593 -0.006 -0.101 0.9196 
IFRS*EBTP +    2.184*** 4.77 0.0000 
IFRS*SIGN ?    0.592* 1.76 0.0815* 
Adjusted R² 
F-statistic 
Observation 
0.3502 
4.635 
120 
0.4628 
6.13 
120 
Regression 1 : LLP = NPL + LLPt-1 + EBTP + SIZE + SIGN + GDPR + IFRS + POST + LOAN 
Regression 2: LLP= NPL+ LLPt-1 + LOAN + EBTP + SIGN + POST+ GDPR + IFRS + IFRS*SIGN + IFRS*EBTP 
Note: All regression model includes fixed effects. Significant at 10%*, 5%** and 1%*** (two-tailed test). POST dummy is used to capture change to 
capital regime rather than MCAP and TRC because bank data on Basel regulatory capital ratio was not available until 2008. 
 
4.3 Robustness Test 
 
Table 3 reports the robustness analysis. First, I divide the period into pre-crisis (2002-2006) and post-crisis (2010-2013). 
To isolate the effect of the financial crisis, I exclude 2007-2009 bank-year observations. Regression 3 (i) and (ii), show 
that banks tend to smooth income and signal loan quality in the post-crisis period relative to the pre-crisis period. 
However, the statistical relation is insignificant. This insignificant relation is suspected to be caused by 2007-2009 bank-
year observations that was excluded. However, the sign on the GDPR coefficient is statistically significant in the post 
crisis period suggesting that post-crisis loan loss provisioning is procyclical with the business cycle.  
Second, regression 4 (a) and 4 b (ii) show a significant positive relation between LLP and EBTP in the post-IFRS 
period after controlling for total capital management. Thus, providing supports for the income smoothing hypothesis. Also, 
the GDPR coefficient show evidence for LLP procyclical behaviour in the post-IFRS period.  
Third, to test the capital management hypothesis using Tier 1 capital (MCAP), I model the regression by 
introducing MCAP and TRC separately into two regression [4b (i) and (ii)], thereafter after, I combine both alternative 
capital variables into a single regression model [4b (iii)] to observe their relation to LLP. I find strong evidence to support 
the capital management hypothesis in the post-IFRS period relative to the pre-IFRS period as shown in Regression 4b (i) 
and (iii). It reports a significant negative relation between LLP and MCAP (t-stat = -3.48) in the post-IFRS period. 
Finally, testing for joint motivations in the post IFRS period in regression 4b (iii), I find a significant positive sign on 
EBTP*MCAP coefficient (3.94). This suggest that when banks are faced with two conflicting motivations, that is, 
smoothing and capital management, Nigerian bank managers may prefer to smooth income rather than manage 
regulatory capital. This is inferred based on the more positive sign on the EBTP*MCAP interactive variable. Also, when 
faced with the choice between signaling and capital management (MCAP*SIGN), Nigerian banks may prefer to manage 
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Tier 1 capital than to signal loan quality. This is indicated by the significant negative sign on the MCAP*SIGN coefficient (-
1.73, Į=10%). Interestingly, I find strong evidence that banks in Nigeria seem to have no incentive to jointly smooth 
income and signal loan quality. This is inferred from SIGN*EBTP (-3.68, Į=1%) 
 
 Conclusion 5.
 
Consistent with Healy and Wahlen (1999), it is important for regulators to understand accrual-based accounting numbers 
used by bank managers to influence reported earnings, as well as, bank capital. The findings in this study is the first to 
provide evidence for smoothing, signaling and capital management via LLP in Nigeria. Ahmed et al. (2014) only 
examined income smoothing via LLP. In the present study, I test whether LLPs is used for capital management, earnings 
management and signaling in Nigerian banks during the voluntary adoption of IFRS. Overall, I find evidence to indicate 
that Nigerian banks use LLP to manage capital, smooth reported earnings and signal loan quality in the post-IFRS period. 
Also, I find increased bank provisioning following the implementation of Basel capital regulation immediately after the 
2008 financial crisis. Finally, a robustness analysis show that joint motivations to influence LLP exists, as well as, trade-
offs between two or more motivations. My findings indicate that, during IFRS reporting periods, reported earnings and 
related accounting numbers do not truly reflect the underlying economic reality of Nigerian banks based on the results. 
Standard setters and bank regulators (IASB and the Central Bank of Nigeria) might consider the prevalence of these 
motivations when evaluating the risk profile of banks and how these motivations, if pervasive, might pose systemic risk on 
the financial system. Finally, it is expected that a policy maker might conclude that these motivations indicate 
manipulative accounting practices by bank managers, however, policy implications drawn from the results in this study 
should take into consideration the fact that bank regulatory incentives may also have encouraged these motivations as 
well. IFRS alone is not to blame. Future research may examine other accounting numbers, accrual-based or based on 
real activities, which banks might influence to manage earnings and capital.  
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Tables 
 
Table 3: Robustness Regression 
 
Regression 3 Regression 4 
Pre-crisis 
(2002-2006) 
Post-Crisis 
(2010-2013) 
Pre-IFRS  
(2002-2007) (a) Post-IFRS (2009-2013) (b) 
(i) (ii) (i) (ii) MCAP (i) TRC (ii) Interaction (iii) 
Variables Coeff t-stat 
p-
value
Coeff
t-stat 
p-
value
Coeff 
t-stat p-value 
Coeff 
t-stat p-value 
Coeff 
t-stat 
p-
value 
Coeff 
t-stat 
p-
value 
C 
0.087**
2.34 
 
0.0254 0.0560.56 0.5822
0.305**
2.16 0.0364 
0.025 
0.42 0.6792 
-0.006
-0.1 0.9208 
0.015 
0.29 0.7745 
NPL 0.041**2.55 0.0158
0.234
1.56 0.1332
0.140*
1.81 0.0777 
0.3743*** 
3.85 0.0005 
0.134*
1.72 0.0953 
0.309*** 
3.55 0.0013 
LLPT -0.188 -0.94 0.3561
-0.055
-0.24 0.815
2.283**
2.43 0.0193 
-0.029 
0.43 0.6709 
-0.0914 
-1.52 0.1378 
0.014 
0.21 0.8382 
EBTP -0.285*-1.83 0.0769
0.079
0.65 0.5218
-
2.728***
-3.89 
0.0003 -0.483 -1.73 0.0925 
0.529*
2.0 0.0536 
0.529* 
2.0 0.0536 
SIZE -0.006**-2.09 0.0436
-0.004
-0.84 0.4108
-0.017*
-1.71 0.0945 
0.0007 
0.18 0.8586 
0.0004
0.11 0.9168 
-0.0004 
-0.14 0.8929 
SIGN 0.075 0.86 0.3942
0.142
0.68 0.5033
-0.241
-0.57 0.5685 
0.243 
1.11 0.2737 
-0.38 
-1.42 0.1659 
-0.077 
-0.23 0.8929 
GDPR 0.00007-0.57 0.5701
-
0.013**
-2.16 
0.0421 0.00010.17 0.8607 
-0.014*** 
-2.922 0.0062 
-0.011** 
-2.28 0.0289 
-0.012** 
-2.67 0.0123 
LOAN 0.001 0.084 0.9328
0.204
1.19 0.2452
-0.011
-0.13 0.8953 
0.169** 
2.22 0.0334 
0.139*
1.87 0.070 
0.169** 
2.45 0.0204 
TRC   
-
0.0003
-0.27 
0.7874     0.007 1.57 0.1249 
0.016** 
3.37 0.0022 
MCAP   0.0020.185 0.8551   
-0.012* 
-1.72 0.094   
-0.026** 
-3.48 0.0016 
EBTP*MCAP       0.299* 2.033 0.0501   
0.67*** 
3.97 0.0004 
TRC*EBTP         -0.182* -1.70 0.0985 
-
0.427*** 
-3.54 
0.0014 
TRC*SIGN         0.242*** 3.136 0.0036 
0.33*** 
2.85 0.0081 
MCAP*SIGN       0.025 0.24 0.8144   
-0.29* 
-1.73 0.0941 
MCAP*EBTP*SIGN       3.98 1.26 0.2170   
5.684 
1.43 0.1630 
TRC*EBTP*         2.743 0.2860 6.73** 0.0409 
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SIGN 1.085 2.14 
SIGN*EBTP       -7.648 -1.37 0.1811 
-6.012
-0.94 0.3540 
-
25.81*** 
-3.68 
0.0009 
Adj R² 
F-stat 
P(F-stat) 
0.4574 
3.58*** 
0.0009 
 
0.3301
2.07*
0.056
 
0.6001
6.553 
0.000 
 
0.3551 
2.69*** 
0.008 
 
0.2824
2.205** 
0.027 
 
0.5289 
3.75*** 
0.0006 
Obs. 50  40  60  50  50  50  
Regression 3(i) & 4(a): LLP = NPL + LLPt-1 + LOAN+ EBTP+ SIGN+ SIZE+ GDPR 
Regression b (i): LLP = NPL + LLPt-1 + LOAN + EBTP + SIGN + MCAP + SIZE + GDPR 
Model b(ii) (excludes MCAP): LLP = NPL + LLPt-1 + LOAN + EBTP + SIGN + TRC + SIZE + GDPR 
Model b(iii) (combines TRC+MCAP): LLP = NPL + LLPt-1 + LOAN+ EBTP + SIGN + MCAP + TRC+ SIZE + GDPR + EBTP*MCAP + TRC*EBTP + 
TRC*SIGN + MCAP*SIGN + MCAP*EBTP*SIGN + TRC*EBTP*SIGN+SIGN*EBTP 
Note: Fixed effects for all regression models, apply. Significant at 10%*, 5%** and 1%*** (two-tailed test). The pre-and post-crisis regressions 
excludes 2007-2009 bank-year observation to control for the severe impact of the crisis on balance sheet of Nigerian banks 
 
Table 4: Full Sample period pearson correlation coefficients 
Correlation          
Probability LLP NPL LLPt-1 LOAN EBTP SIGN GDPR POST IFRS SIZE 
LLP 1.000          
 -----          
NPL 0.515*** 1.000         
 0.000 -----         
LLPt-1 0.048 0.267 1.000        
 0.598 0.003 -----        
LOAN -0.101 -0.041 0.111 1.000       
 0.273 0.658 0.229 -----       
EBTP -0.027 0.021 0.032 0.298 1.000      
 0.769 0.823 0.731 0.001 -----      
SIGN 0.114 0.181 0.087 0.055 0.0465 1.000     
 0.217 0.048 0.342 0.554 0.614 -----     
GDPR -0.091 0.044 -0.097 -0.145 0.019 0.017 1.000    
 0.322 0.635 0.287 0.112 0.838 0.853 -----    
POST 0.182** 0.052 0.1934 0.374 0.017 0.0954 -0.4749 1.000   
 0.047 0.576 0.034 0.000 0.853 0.3002 0.000 -----   
IFRS -0.035 -0.043 0.211 0.439 0.075 -0.064 -0.408 0.845 1.000  
 0.705 0.642 0.021 0.000 0.416 0.485 0.000 0.000 -----  
SIZE -0.055 -0.081 0.1165 0.239 -0.155 -0.103 -0.386 0.548 0.517 1.000 
 0.546 0.381 0.205 0.009 0.091 0.261 0.000 0.000 0.000 ----- 
Note: p-values is below pearson correlation coefficients. Correlation coefficient is above p-values 
 
Table 5: Correlation Post IFRS 
Correlation          
Probability LLP NPL LLPt-1 LOAN EBTP SIGN MCAP TRC GDPR SIZE 
LLP 1.000          
 -----          
NPL 0.248*          
 0.083          
LLPt-1 -0.069 0.460***         
 0.631 0.001         
LOAN 0.358** 0.099 0.079        
 0.011 0.489 0.583        
EBTP 0.419*** 0.292 0.031 0.350       
 0.002 0.039 0.828 0.013       
SIGN 0.155 -0.003 0.212 0.129 0.069      
 0.282 0.984 0.139 0.371 0.632      
MCAP 0.114 -0.544 -0.429 0.428 0.018 0.169     
 0.432 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.903 0.238     
TRC 0.011 0.058 0.053 0.133 -0.0004 0.079 0.222    
 0.94 0.687 0.714 0.354 0.997 0.585 0.122    
GDPR -0.137 0.381 0.191 0.229 -0.030 -0.189 -0.011 0.074   
 0.342 0.007 0.185 0.109 0.834 0.187 0.937 0.607   
SIZE -0.046 -0.269 0.0134 0.112 -0.249 -0.161 0.168 -0.059 -0.145  
 0.748 0.058 0.926 0.438 0.081 0.264 0.243 0.679 0.315  
           
